ABSTRACT In recent years, cooperative systems have been gaining relevance in autonomous driving to such an extent that they are necessary to reach the final goal, the autonomous car. But the relevance that the Vehicular Ad-hoc NETworks (VANETs) have acquired shows that it is still an immature technology and needs more time to develop. Proof of this is that most of these systems do not provide real security in communications; so the scientific community has tried to develop new technologies to allow greater security in this type of communications. Therefore, in this paper, a review of how the technology has evolved to maintain safety in the VANETs will be carried out; in addition, a breakdown of the different security technologies grouped by their type and the advantages and disadvantages of each one.
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution that autonomous vehicles have experienced in recent years, has caused an increase in demand for new technologies to allow the cooperative operation of systems in vehicles. A cooperative system involves communications, in the field of automotive, the VANETs [1] . These communication networks allow the transmission of information between vehicles, Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), as well as infrastructures, Vehicle-to-infraestructure (V2I).
VANETs allow to expand the amount of information that a vehicle is able to obtain as well as the distance at which the information can be perceived. This is the main concept of Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications, breaking with the visual horizon of the vehicle and perceived by the sensors, to reach the electronic horizon. This fact allows us to predict situations in advance and act much more efficiently in situations ranging from everyday conditions to high-risk situations due to accidents.
Thanks to the potential that technology has demonstrated, there have been rapid advances in communications, reaching and developing new systems that make it possible to implement safer and more efficient driving strategies. Proof of this are the Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) systems [2] , [3] , which allow maximum use of communications
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in order to collect more information from the environment and generate strategies to improve driving. However, this rapid evolution of these systems has revealed one of the great problems of the 21st century, cybersecurity.
Like all technology related to driving, the main requirement that must be met is to maintain or improve the safety of road users. And the fact of being able to obtain fraudulent messages that jeopardize vehicles' occupants integrity, causes a great concern in the scientific community that sees how all the advances produced are useless because they cannot combat these attacks.
Due to the nature of wireless networks broadcast transmissions, makes them especially vulnerable to attacks and an arduous task to ensure their privacy and security. That's why researchers have devoted the last few years to new methods that can maintain and ensure that desired security.
In spite of all the efforts made, the technology capable of guaranteeing the necessary security level to carry out a complete deployment of the communications systems has not yet been developed. Therefore, in order to facilitate the task to the researchers it has been decided to carry out a compilation of the current state of the art and show the advantages and vulnerabilities of each solution proposed up to now.
II. RELATED WORK
The development and implementation of necessary technology to carry out VANETs communications, is relatively recent. It is not surprising that security in these communications is also something that has begun to take more interest in the last 10 years, due to this, there are not many articles that review the state of the art related to security.
To lay the foundations for this review, it has been decided to use the articles [4] , [5] as a first approach. These articles already base the different types of security that VANETs can hold. In this way, priority is given to maintaining the privacy and security of each message sent, for which a common point is established, the Certifying Authoritys (CAs).
In the same way that technology has advanced, the way of understanding the security that is needed to maintain the integrity of systems has also evolved. In this way, [6] shows different technologies that are more current and how they have evolved. In addition, different comparisons of technologies are built in order to achieve a better global vision. However, in [7] they theorize about the different types of security and when they were postulated, each technology is contrasted with the general operation of the VANETs.
The aim of this study is to discuss the actual state of the art of the security in VANETs. The first step to understand the situation and also the first problem is in the current standards, where we find that there are three different standards: European, U.S. and the Chinese. In spite of this, the U.S standard is taken as a reference, partly because it was the first and the most advanced, and it is where the rest are looked at in order to adapt the established guidelines to the legislation of each country. Specifically, the American Standard IEEE 1609 Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) [8] is responsible for setting the pace for the rest of the standards.
The WAVE standard is built over the IEEE 802.11p standard for WLAN communications, which work in the frequency of 5.9GHz. All the standards have sections dedicated exclusively to security in communication systems, in the case of the European standards defined in the ETSI EN 302 636-4-1 [9] , there are several specific sections dedicated exclusively to security. They describe the type of security that must be maintained in the communication modules to send or receive messages.
In the standard they define two levels of security, the first one is that the systems must have a certifying entity that ratifies that the issuer is the one who claims to be and is registered in the system as issuing entity. In this way, an authentication and authorization system is established, supported by a Service Advertisement Message (SAM/WSA) protocol, that is used by a service provider unit to inform Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) stations about available local services or about services that can be accessed on a remote server.
However, the standards have evolved as new developments appeared that have allowed to break their own limitations. In this way, and as always happens with legislation, the standards have gone a little behind the development of technology. However, and as has been experimenting more and more to discover new applications while finding new problems, the standards have been trying to solve all of them. Therefore, it is important to analyze the state in which the standards are found, and more specifically the European one.
III. EUROPEAN STANDARD
In all relating matters to European legislation on intervehicular communications, it is necessary to consult the standards set by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). Specifically, the ETSI EN 302 636-4-1 [9] standard of 2017 marks the basis of communications and security that must be maintained at all times. Additionally, there are several documents where the security section ETSI TS 102 723-8 [10] and ETSI TS 103 097 [11] is specified in more detail. It is also necessary to note that both documents are TS, which means that they are not a final version of the standard and are subject to extensive changes as technology evolves. Figure 1 shows the standard security layer establish in parallel to all the layers of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) protocol, [12] . Both images correspond to the encryption/decryption processes that must be executed for each message to meet with the standards. In the encryption process, figure 1 a), The message has to access the security layer in each of the defined levels: Facilities, Networking and Transport and Access.
It is necessary to understand the role that each communication device plays in the entire security infrastructure. In general terms, it is established that each device must be qualified by a CA that endorse communications. To do this, it is necessary to establish which are the authorities so that all, the devices have the same in their records. On the other hand, when the CAs have been established, keys can already be established to encrypt communications between two pairs of devices.
However, this type of security has several drawbacks, such as the need to have each Internet connection device to validate and update the certificates. In case of not having Internet and keeping the record of the CAs internally, it falls into the problem of maintaining the same key in the service. All these problems are possible security breaches, but all of them are defined in greater depth in section IV.
IV. SECURITY
It is obvious that cybersecurity in communications networks is not a new problem which has not found different solutions as technology progressed. The difference is that the communications have a process of establishing communications in which a key exchange occurs and the security they will have to encrypt the messages is configured. But this establishment process disappears in VANETs due to the time lost during this process.
If we take into account that the reason for eliminating this process is, if we take into account that a vehicle traveling at 100 km h −1 , in a second is able to travel 27 m. This distance is too large to be ignored, in pursuit of the safety of road users. Therefore, VANETs try to minimize the transmission time of the messages eliminating any possible delay in this way.
But it is a fact, that like any other network, VANETs are not exempt from malicious attacks. In addition, this type of networks are highly sensitive due to two factors: they are wireless networks and that the type of emitted message is broadcast. These two factors make it difficult to secure networks against possible external attacks and excessively vulnerable since anyone can receive the messages, issued simply by being close to the broadcast area.
Therefore, during the last years researchers have tried to develop an algorithm that guarantees both, security and privacy in communications. It is true, that technology is in a phase of development and experimentation that will require many tests before seeing a finished and finished products. However, the constant changes in the standards make the task even more difficult, but on the other hand, we have the opportunity to work with the peak of technology which allows a lot of development freedom.
In Europe, there are clear examples of technology development with projects such as AUTOCITS, C-ROADS, CORDIS, CONCORDA and many others that open the possibilities of technology. One of the most active projects in recent years is SeVeCom, with several articles [13] , [14] , [15] that show a solution to have privacy through certificates in communications and different problems that have been found throughout weather. Another example of authentication through certifying entities is RAISE, [16] , [17] which demonstrates the need to use external connection to internet to maintain the system.
But none of them come to give a fully solution to the problems posed by security. It is true that the result of being a technology in its early stages of development is to wait for other characteristics that are to come and to facilitate the task, as is the case with 5G communications. But as with current technology, this will bring new problems and objectives to face.
Finally and to better understand the types of security systems that have been developed, in [5] they show a schematized classification of technologies according to the way they are applied: Hardware Security, Authentication, Detection and Correction of Malicious Data, Public Key Infrastructure, Group Signature and Certificate Revocation.
However, this paper delves deeper into each technology of the previous scheme to show the current state of development of each, and the vulnerabilities that exist today with the aim of serving researchers as a basis on which to base new solutions.
A. HARDWARE SECURITY
The hardware-based security is proposed as a transparent and fast solution to detect malicious messages or encrypt messages between two devices that have the same technology, [18] . In general, there are two types of technologies that allows to delimit this field: External devices that enable the encryption/decryption of messages or Tamper-Proof device (TPD) and software that allows tracking events that occur around the device, the first step for the detection and correction of malicious data, knows as Event Data Recorder (EDR).
One example of approach for Physical-Layer Network Coding is shown in [19] , where they further considered channel coding, and simulation verifies that the approach provides much lower bit error rate in the low signal-tonoise ratio regime compared with two different benchmarks. Another tracking software is presented in [20] , they proposed a physical-layer rogue edge detection scheme that analyze shared ambient radio signals with the corresponding MAC address in a given time slot to determines test threshold in the detection and guarantee the optimal detection policy. In order to increase the result, they works with and algorithm with reinforcement learning technique that can significantly reduce the detection error rate .
On the other hand, another solution to enhance wireless V2V channel-secrecy capacity is proposed in [21] , where they impose a signal transmission diversity with precoding techniques that permits to extract the relaying underlying multipath and Doppler diversity. Also in [22] develop a helper device to encrypt the messages with their own secret keys that are periodically update. VOLUME 7, 2019 However, there are other approaches that allow the use of hardware as a basis to implement systems cryptographicbased access control like the one posed in [23] . With this solution it is possible to mount a message exchange system in a secure way by integrating moving object modeling techniques with cryptographic policies. The framework they provide is a great approach to hardware being more active part of cybersecurity systems.
All this solutions try to solve the problems with spoofing, forgery, denial of services and many others attacks. Since as shown in [24] , security at physical layer is strictly necessary since the probabilities that the presence of sourceto-eavesdropper link has significant impact on the secrecy outage probability performance and may also reveal the of each relay location. But in the case of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), the actual technology is not enough to solve completely the problem as shown in [25] , only in any cases is possibly to mitigate this kind of attacks but not in the physical-layer.
B. AUTHENTICATION
Authentication is a process that allows vehicles to ratify who is said to be within the network. This process can be carried out in different ways such as certificates, digital signatures or trusted lists. For example, in [26] we show an example of authentication through registration lists to preserve privacy that does not require bilinear pairing which is one of the most expensive and complicated processes of the current cryptography.
Some papers as [27] claim that authentication is an inevitable process to guarantee security in network where in each node their speed varies between 10 to 40 m/s. So for that reason and to avoid possible attacks against the network, they propose a solution based on an Extended Three Party Password based Authenticated Key Change (E-3PAKE).
However, this type of technology, by themselves, is not able to face and guarantee fully security services. Therefore, in many articles such as [28] use authentication along with other techniques such as the detection of malicious software in order to complete possible failures.
Nevertheless, authentication systems are subject to multiple types of attacks such as invalid service requests, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, verification failures, high overhead and high verification delay. And even though technologies are offered, that are capable of evading many of these attacks with technologies based on cloud computing like [29] , the computational cost required is high. In spite of this, there are solutions that provide computationally efficient solutions capable of raising the privacy preserving anonymous mutual authentication scheme, [30] .
Another type of schema developed is focused on anonymous authentication like [31] . In this case, the type of V2X communications is separated into two types of schemes with different credentials, inter-vehicular communications or V2V and communications with infrastructures or V2I. In the case of V2V communications, it is carried out under the rationale of ''witness update outsourcing'', and in the V2I it is allowed that the On Board Unit (OBU) can operate entirely on the compact bilinear group. In the Fig. 2 , a comparison of the delay produced by the authentication systems in a simulated network environment is shown. Taking into account that simulations pose an idyllic and parameterized schema, it can be considered that in a real environments deployment the delay is even higher. Therefore, and although a priory the added time is not excessive, the delay is not despicable and would be a variable to consider for this type of networks that are highly sensitive to delay.
C. DETECTION AND CORRECTION OF MALICIOUS DATA
One of the most important parts and also the first approach for a secure system is the detection of malicious attacks. Detection systems allow subtracting the information necessary for the study and development of systems capable of preventing/avoiding attacks against possible gaps in security.
Furthermore, of all the processes that go into security management, it is probably the most difficult. This is because the task of detecting where security failures exist and therefore, who is using them in real time to perform an attack, requires an absolute knowledge of the technology used. Other studies such as [32] reveal new techniques that allow a more efficient detection of attacks.
In addition, new branches of research allow us to innovate such as [33] , which takes advantage of the fact that VANETs emissions are made using a modification of network in a promiscuous state to obtain all the data over VANETs and through algorithms of Support Vector Machine (SVM) using for data analysis to establish a shared trust value for every vehicle on the network as Trust Aware SVM-Based IDS (TSIDS). Another example of different technologies for the detection of intrusions in the system is raised in [34] , which uses Artificial Neural Network (ANN) trained to be able to detect different types of attacks on networks.
Therefore, there is a wide spectrum of different techniques to deal with detection and it is not a closed and easily classifiable process. To better appreciate the different techniques we need a more generic scheme like the one shown in the compilation that is made in [35] where a broader taxonomy of the current state of the Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) is addressed.
D. PUBLIC KEY INFRAESTRUCTURE
A public key infrastructure is the security element par excellence used in communications, however, to be carried out first an exchange of public keys must be produced between sender and receiver. In the case of VANETs has several disadvantages, the first is the time required for the exchange of keys to encrypt messages, then the second is that these communications are produced wirelesses, with which you can listen to this transmission.
However, it has been trying to solve these occurrences so that in [36] they propose a new security scheme based on bilinear pairing-based cryptography, in spite of requiring an exchange time, they try to minimize it in order to optimize the system. Other articles try to find new solutions as in [37] , which use a decentralized Public Key Infraestructure (PKI) system combined with a certificate revocation system. For the keys generation they use Bayesian Coalition Game (BCG) concepts, where each user represents a player and a dynamic coalition among them, is formulated using symmetric key encryption and hash-based message authentication.
Besides the use of public keys allows to avoid the use of entities that certify the authenticity. A clear example of this is [38] , where they propose a new self-organized method of authentication for VANETs. This method allows to each node to function as a message-certifying entity and use a cryptography protocol including a zero-knowledge proof. In this scheme, each node must use to convince another on the possession of certain secret without revealing anything about it, which allows non-encrypted communication during authentication. Despite of the proposed solution, this method of authentication produces a prior exchange of messages that slows down the V2X communications themselves.
E. GROUP SIGNATURE
Group Signature is normally used in conjunction with certificates such as technology that allows node's authentication. So, it is a technology based on distance where it can establish authentication zones where each node in the area is part of the same group of signatures.
In this way, in [39] delimit the area of the emission group to the area in which the Road Side Units (RSUs) are placed, and these same devices are responsible for managing and updating the keys. Another example is [40] that raises an authentication protocol that combines group signature and identity based signature. They allow to disseminate authenticated messages where anonymity is assured while providing the relevant CAs with the tools to track messages in case of illegality.
Another type of group signature is to use pseudonymbased schemes. A clear example is shown in [41] , where they use together with trust framework, so that if a node changes pseudonym which may cause confusion when doing trackers, we could maintain an additional clue to track vehicle. Additionally, the algorithm permits to guarantee the privacy preservation and reputation evaluation.
As can be seen in the works listed above, most use this technology using certificates or trusted entities to support the technology in order to ensure the security of the systems. However, this combination of technologies does not prevent all possible attacks. In fact, this type of group signature carries a delay at the beginning of the authentication process that can lead to several DoS attacks. And due to the concern it causes, some articles such as [42] , which propose a solution based on puzzle-based co-authentication to mitigate this type of attacks.
F. CERTIFYING AUTHORITY
Systems with CAs are the basis of any other network security technology. This is because it is necessary to be able to differentiate and identify if a message, before even treating it, comes from a trusted entity or someone outside the system that may want to carry out an attack on the network.
In fact, Certificate revocation technology is the only tool that has been accepted as necessary even in the standards, ETSI TS 103 097 [11] . However, there are two problems linked to technology when using tools such as trusted lists or hardware elements. And is that by not having Internet credentials are fixed and invariable allowing greater ease to break security.
However, and due to what is marked in standards, many works focus the security base on certificate revocation systems. For example, in [43] show a certificate system that follows a hierarchical distribution to soften the effect of certificate scalability by allowing a more efficient certificate distribution scheme. As you can guess, the articles of lists of certificates focus their attention on creating more efficient systems of storage of certificates, another example of this is posed in [44] , that raises a system of cluster for storage that according to the results of the simulation shows better performance of the delivery ratio, throughput, and latency.
Following the same line, there are more articles like the previous ones that try to mitigate the effect of scalability in these systems. A different approach is the use of preserve security systems and use the certificates as support capable of revoking credibility according to possible attacks on the network, [45] , [46] .
On the other hand some articles named in previous sections [38] , proposed a different solution for the certificate section. In this article propose a system in which each node of the network takes on the function of message-certifying entity, in such a way that a central certifying entity on which the system depends is not needed. In this same schema, [47] shows the ability to check the authenticity of the received data messages and maintains a trust value for each of its neighbors is delegated to each vehicle. To do this, they analyze the trust model metrics to improve the ability to detect malicious nodes and possible attacks from the network.
Therefore, either through use of Certifying Authority or decentralized systems that give each node the ability to certify messages, the purpose continues to be maintained, to be able to establish a trust network in which external agents that try to introduce messages fraudulent to the system are dismissed.
V. GLOBAL ANALYZE
Through the review carried out and comparing the different results in the most recent contributions, a global idea of the current situation of the VANETs can be obtained. Despite this, we must bear in mind that there is still a long process of study to be carried out. However, it can be gathered from all this that among all the possible solutions proposed, not even the standard has been chosen as a reference for a final system that allows to guarantee an integral and complete security.
However, the continuous advances and studies have served to obtain a common idea, and that technologies such as digital certificates are patents and necessary as the basis to perform any security system in VANETs. Part of this reflection is reflected in the standards themselves that include this type of technology as an essential part of the systems.
However, many proposed systems, despite the great contributions and improvements they show, have not been tested against different types of malicious attacks, as you can see in the table 1. Which means that a security system cannot be fully validated as a viable solution if it has not been tested before for each type of attack. This is strictly necessary, since an efficient security must be able to guarantee a complete security, even more in this type of systems that operate on vehicles that can suppose a high risk for the integrity of the users of the road.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are many technologies that try to cover different problems that arise in the communications security of VANETs. However, despite the efforts there is nothing definitive that is postulated as the basis to follow. Although the standards and the scientific community have agreed that certain elements of security, such as certificate revocation, have to be part of the systems that are developed.
Furthermore and despite the many investigations and improvements that have been made, there are milestones that still need to be improved, such as the computational cost or the difficulty to establish security keys that are not easily avoidable.
